Web of Life

The reforms carried out under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership in the late 1970 and 1980s after a consuming power struggle points to a recognition of failure of Mao’s ideological base. That ideology constituted orthodox Marxist denunciation of capitalism and Maoism. It emphasized the correctness of public ownership; and upheld economic planning and public ownership and rejected capitalism and private ownership outright. The result was a tight political control by the Party, but left the economy lingering in backwardness despite many innovations by a combination of Party stalwarts and inexperienced cadres. From time to time Mao himself contributed to destabilization through such moves as the Commune movement, and at ideological level through his much disputed ‘cultural revolutions.’ It became clear that the country could not be satisfied with such ideological manifestations alone and that sooner or later had to come to grips with the reality of staggering economy.

Under Deng Xiaoping, guided by pragmatism, the ideological control exercised by Maoists and orthodox Marxists was weakened and reform initiatives were encouraged. This was achieved not without a vicious power struggle. The upholding of Marxist Leninism and Mao Zedong’s Thoughts, Socialism, the leadership of the CCP, the dictatorship of the proletariat were pronounced as the guiding principles (Four Principles) for China’s economic reforms. (11 Central Committee decisions, December, 1978). The take over of Mao’s legacy contained in these principles was obviously a matter of form in the true Chinese tradition of swimming with the current and abandoning it. The essence, as Deng himself announced it, was to uphold the leadership of the CCP. The question was in what direction was the leadership of the CCP going to proceed henceforth. Deng’s path was described as "the middle course" but in retrospect, it would seem that he pushed ideology to the side.

The main difference between Deng’s politics and Mao’s, as one authority put it, was that the former wanted to ‘maximize opportunities in hand" while the latter was ‘structured by future- oriented revolutionary mission". After the disastrous effects of the ‘cultural revolution’ it appeared to Deng that the need of the hour was to develop China’s economy at all cost. He seized the mood presented by the all round damage caused by the ‘cultural revolution.’ However, these reform ideas contradicted ChinaCommunist ideology nurtured all along and even in post-Mao era had to overcome difficulties on this account. These difficulties which manifested in the form of several campaigns such as the ‘Anti-spiritual pollution’ campaign (1983/4), the ‘Structured Reform’ attempt (1986) and the ‘Socialist" Ideology Education’ campaign (190/2) did not stand in the way of the momentum gained by the reform movement following the agreement reached at the 1978 Third Plenum recognizing the primacy of economic development against ideology. The struggle within the CCP continued nevertheless but after Deng Xiaoping’s famous tour of the South in 1992, the intense debate on the ideological issue (Mr. Socialism Vs. Mr.Capitalism), was closed (or stopped) and capitalism was endorsed as a means of economic development.

The issues of the long drawn out debate are too complex to be enumerated here but it may be noted that Mao was not under direct attack at the outset. Such an outright attack was not possible without a heavy fall-out as he symbolized the Part’s power and collective leadership. However, by 1981 there was an attempt to separate Mao’s errors from his ‘thoughts’, and that way Maors thoughts came under scrutiny on the ground that errors arose from his thoughts. This may appear as a Chinese jig-saw-puzzle but to one familiar with Chinese logic and metaphor it should not be surprising. That reassessment of Mao’s role provided the legitimacy for Deng’s leadership. The criterion thereafter remained economic performance.

However, despite discarding of the Communist ideology on economic development on orthodox Marxist lines, and Deng’s belief that once that economic success and prosperity was achieved political and ideological questions would be eventually settled, (this has been questioned), the need to uphold the leadership of the CCP continued as political stability was considered a prerequisite for economic development. The CCP’s role to develop productive forces through reform by adhering to the "two basic points" of upholding the "four cardinal points" and persevering in form and opening to the outside7 was endorsed.. The essence of Deng Xiaopin’s theory has been summed up by one China watcher as ‘ political utility endorsing capitalist practice in China’s economic development on the one hand and emphasizing the legitimacy of the CCP leadership in the refom on the rather....the end result (being) the CCP transforming itself from a "Party of Politics" into a ‘’Party of Economics" although the fundamental

contradiction between market economy and CCP dictatorship remained unsolved" (Zheng Shipping, University of Vermont, USA).

Post-Deng China

The leadership that followed Deng had to face the social and political ramifications of the contradiction resulting from the curious combination of one-party-state socialism with competitive capitalism. This can be seen from successor Jiang Zemin’s rather cautious approach when he assumed the role of General Secretary and leadership. Whatever may be the theoretical assurances to set aside reality, it is quite clear from evidence present that CCP’s role has declined and social solidarity eroded as a result of Deng’s reforms.

Party membership itself could not be confined as a monopoly of, of peasants and workers, members of the army (PLA), government officials and cadres and of some intellectuals. Its door was opened, and more so by Jiang Zemin, to the entrepreneur class, that means the capitalist class by the earlier definition. This class may have been seeking a security mechanism that way but Jiang’s plan was to instill a consciousness on the deeper commitment to Communist cause among these groups. That fitted into his "rule by virtue’ doctrine which has been variously interpreted. The CCP in its new economic role also witnessed the shift of its power base from thc center to localities under new dcfinition which itself contributed to dissipation of its power. The new emphasis on economics also inflicted much damage to the unified political leadership. At another level, the individual corruption among party cadres which had become an increasing tendency within the system expanded in dimension under the new ‘economic’ dispensation. Close observers have also noted a resultant psychological and moral void resulting from depoliticisation of the Party leading to a collapse of social solidarity.

Jian Zemin’s burden was to build a new political order using the substantial economic growth achieved under his immediate predecessor by instilling a new moral spirit into the party and the people. He used the slogan of "Three Stresses"- rule by law, rule by virtue, and the "three represents." The latter meant that the CCP represents the most advanced mode of production, the most advanced culture, and the interest of the majority of people. The Thee Represents were expected to guide the thought and behaviour of leading party members and cadres. On close analysis, on a somewhat lower assessment, it would seem not more than a slogan to give respectability and legitimacy to the transformed CCP whose fortunes were waning. The slogans did not pass without cynicism on the part of the Chinese people who are at no loss for a sense of humour.

Jiang was at a disadvantage compared to his predecessors, both Mao and Deng, in many respects. He also belonged to the younger (third) generation of’ leaders and was no longer a ‘paramount leader’ as the other two were. In governance, he faced the handicap of facing a center whose power had been eroded with the importance gained by local governments. He had to resort to politics to overcome the problems, first through the campaign of "Three Stresses" within the party and the government from 1997 to 2001 and by emphasizing the ‘rule by virtue’ which meant to indoctrinate party workers and cadres with a new set of work styles through an appeal to morality, ideals, and beliefs in governing the country compatible with the socialist legal framework, and Marxist-Leninist - Maoist thoughts and Deng Xiaopiang theory.

The old "gerentocracy" in the party had also come to an end with Deng’s package of reforms leading to the retirement of 1.3 million aging officials who joined the CCP in 1949 and the enlistment of over half a million new younger members. Under the new dispensation, Jiang himself could not be expected to hold office long as the leaders from the old guard did. For him the time was short as long as he did not possess the legitimacy or charisma of Mao or Deng to manipulate to continue in power. As Chinese politics go, Jiang’s resort to politics through his slogans was also a way to consolidate his position within the party, strength his leadership, and in a way, to leave a legacy of his own even if it may nat be comparable with that of his immediate predecessor. Jiang did not deviate from Deng’s theory but ‘swam with the current’ and even wanted the party to acknowledge the "outstanding elements" of society such as private entrepreneurs, professionals, technical and managerial personnel from non-state sectors, even more than Deng emphasized. His efforts to get these new elements into the party has to be understood in this light.

Jiang was not without opposition in his attempt to liberalise the party and revitalise it with a new vigour by incorporating new elements. The opposition from the conservative left was dealt with a strong hand as much as he had dealt with the pro-democracy element. By the end of his term Jiang saw the party membership which constituted 83 per cent from working class and peasants in 1956 which dropped to 48 per cent recording a further erosion in its traditional base and new elements including the entrepreneurs forming the balance.

China under Denmg Xiaoping and Jiang Xernin has rapidly developed into a modern society with an economy increasingly integrated into the global economy, more particularly, to international capitalism as a result of trade, foreign investment and foreign tourism. The peasantry which once accounted to over 80 per cent of its population has been reduced to under 50 per cent, thc balance mostly forming the new industrial work force. Private enterprises, small and large, had increased from 90,000 in 1989 to over 1.5 million in 1999; and individual business from 12.5 million units to 28.7 million by 1997. In contrast, industrial output in the state sector was down from 76 per cent in 1980 to 26 per cent by 1999.

With this picture of rapid transformation of the economic structure from late 1980s, the ruling party itself transforming into a pro-entrepreneur biased organization, and the social and political fabric itself becoming more pluralistic, there are many questions regarding the future course open to China. The new developments have also created new problems, such as growing rate of unemployment, imbalances in incomes and high rate of creeping corruption. In other words, it has invited all the evils in the capitalist system as well. On the other hand, economic liberalization and marginalisation of the once predominant ideological issues have opened up expectations of democratic reforms in the political field. The question that is being asked is if present politics of China veer towards a political democracy in the future rather than to retaining a centralized one party rule whether of Mao type, or more regionalized Deng and Jiang type? Looking all round, the Pandora’s box seems to have been opened. How the new leadership under Hu Jintao will handle the complicated issues remains to be seen. Will the complex Chinese philosophical tradition with its long history of wisdom throw up solutions? How China will tackle these issues would be a lesson for the whole world.